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Turkey’s Policy toward Syrian Refugees 
Domestic Repercussions and the Need for International Support 
Souad Ahmadoun 
Turkey’s humanitarian activities toward Syrian refugees are part and parcel of its over-
all policy in the Syria conflict. Yet, it has become increasingly clear that the Turkish 
government has overestimated its capacities, and thus failed to deliver sufficient assis-
tance to Syrian refugees on its territory. At the same time the government’s handling of 
the refugee issue has led to stark tensions among Turkey’s political and societal forces, 
as Turkey’s border regions contend with increasing security and economic challenges. 
Germany and its European partners should support Turkey in maintaining and im-
proving services to Syrian refugees in Turkey, and in delivering aid more effectively to 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) inside Syria. They should also push Turkey to adopt 
a long-term strategy for dealing with Syrian refugees. 
 
The recent flow of Syrian-Kurdish refugees 
from the region of Ayn al-Arab (in Kurdish: 
Kobanê) to Turkey is just one of many epi-
sodes in which Turkey has been affected by 
the Syrian refugee crisis. Indeed, ever since 
the militarization of the Syrian uprising 
in mid-2011 Turkey has seen an influx of 
refugees from its neighboring country. In 
early 2011, after the Turkish government 
failed to convince Syrian President Bashar 
al-Assad to engage in profound reforms that 
could have contained the crisis, Ankara 
took a clear stance against the Assad regime: 
it sought the international isolation of the 
regime; it hosted, supported and overtly 
influenced the armed and unarmed oppo-
sition; it tried to shape the international 
coalition through the so-called “Group of 
Friends of the Syrian People”; and it wel-
comed refugees and provided humanitari-
an assistance to civilians and IDPs inside 
Syria. 
Turkey’s Handling of the Crisis 
While Turkey has hosted refugees before 
(for example from Iraq), since April 2011 it 
has for the first time followed an uncondi-
tional “open door policy” toward Syrian 
civilians fleeing from the conflict. At the 
beginning of the conflict, Syrian refugees 
were considered guests rather than legal 
refugees, but since late October 2011 Tur-
key has afforded them “temporary pro-
tection” status, ensuring no forced return 
and imposing no limit on their duration 
of stay. In April 2014, a new migration law 
entered into force granting them “condi-
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tional refugee status”, or temporary asylum, 
under the newly established General Direc-
torate of Migration Management (GDMM). 
From April 2011 to September 2014 an 
estimated total of 1,350,000 Syrians fled to 
Turkey – around 77 percent of them women 
and children – according to the Disaster 
and Emergency Management Presidency 
(AFAD), the main governmental body 
managing the Syrian refugee issue. Some 
220,000 are hosted in 22 relatively well-
equipped camps, including 13 tent cities 
and two container sites located in ten 
provinces of southern and south-eastern 
Turkey: Adiyaman, Adana, Hatay, Gazian-
tep, Kahramanmaras, Kilis, Malatya, Mardin, 
Osmaniye and Sanliurfa. Some 630,000 
refugees are registered outside the camps 
by the AFAD and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but 
the others (an estimated 500,000) have 
remained unregistered. 
While conditions in the camps managed 
by the AFAD in collaboration with the 
UNHCR and other UN agencies are extreme-
ly good, the large numbers of refugees liv-
ing outside the camps (also called “urban 
refugees”) are more vulnerable, as most of 
them do not benefit from services provided 
by the Turkish government or international 
agencies. The exception is health care: 
under a January 2013 governmental decree, 
all Syrian refugees can benefit from free 
primary health care. 
Like many other governments, Ankara 
assumed that the Assad regime would soon 
collapse and refugees would return to 
Syria quickly. Yet, by mid-2014 Turkey had 
already spent about $4 billion on humani-
tarian aid for Syrians, and with no end in 
sight as the refugee influx is not about to 
abate. Consequently, Turkey has recently 
made the admission of Syrians at official 
border crossings conditional on the avail-
ability of places within the camps, or on 
specific humanitarian circumstances 
(e.g. if emergency medical treatment is 
required). It has also temporarily closed 
border crossings such as the one close 
to Kobanê/Ayn al-Arab. 
At the beginning of the crisis Turkey 
rejected any international assistance for its 
humanitarian effort, as it wanted to prove 
that it could deal with matters on its own. 
By mid-2012, however, Ankara started to 
ask the international community to share 
the burden. In October 2014 the Turkish 
government announced that it had received 
only $250 million from international donors 
in the four years since the beginning of the 
crisis. It also blamed the international com-
munity for failure to fulfill refugee quotas 
requested by the UN, and for failure to pro-
vide even half of the funds requested to 
help Turkey in its humanitarian effort. 
Key Actors and Domestic Dynamics 
Aid to Syrian refugees has been affected – 
and sometimes exploited – in political 
struggles between Turkey’s governing Jus-
tice and Development Party (AKP) and its 
former ally, the Hizmet movement (also 
known as the Gulen movement), on the one 
hand, and between the AKP and the main 
opposition party, the Republican People’s 
Party (CHP), on the other. The influential 
religious scholar and leader of the Gulen 
Movement, Fethullah Gulen, voiced his 
opposition toward any Turkish involvement 
in the Syrian uprising, calling instead for 
gradual support for economic development 
and reform. 
In early January 2014 police raided offices 
of the government-backed charity organiza-
tion IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation 
in six provinces, and detained at least 23 
people on suspicion of links with the terror-
ist group Jabhat al-Nusra (an al-Qaida off-
shoot in Syria) and of smuggling weapons 
to the Syrian rebellion under the pretext 
of humanitarian work. IHH, an NGO with 
Islamist orientation, has been one of the 
main organizations active in supporting 
Syrian refugees and IDPs, and has also 
played a role in mediation efforts between 
Turkey and rebels who kidnapped Turkish 
journalists. IHH officials denied the accu-
sations of terrorist links, and portrayed 
the raid as a “dirty plot” by police loyal to 
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the Gulen Movement, claiming it was just 
another element in the latter’s conflict 
with the government. For its part, the gov-
ernment accused the “parallel entity” of the 
Gulen Movement of disrupting its humani-
tarian efforts toward the Syrian population, 
using its infiltration of the state’s bureau-
cracy, media, judiciary and police. 
The AKP has also had to deal with criti-
cism from the main opposition party, the 
CHP. The latter has called for a diplomatic 
solution to the Syrian conflict, arguing that 
support for the armed Syrian opposition 
represents a threat to Turkey’s national secu-
rity, and that the refugee issue has polar-
ized the Turkish population. Its leadership 
has also claimed that the Apaydin refugee 
camp was used as a training base for fighters 
from the Free Syrian Army and other Syrian 
groups. In August 2012, the government 
refused to allow a CHP delegation to visit 
the camp to investigate these claims. In 
turn, the AKP has accused the CHP of sup-
porting the Assad regime, for example with 
visits to Damascus in early 2012 and March 
2013. 
Tensions with refugees 
The Syrian conflict has sparked sectarian 
tensions in Turkey. This has especially been 
the case in Turkey’s southern provinces, 
first and foremost Hatay. Hatay province 
was part of Syria until 1939 and has a 
mixed demographic – including Turks, 
Kurds, Circassians, Armenians, Arab Chris-
tians, Sunni and Alawite Arabs – which 
reflects the confessional and ethnic com-
position on the other side of the border. 
Yet, the vast majority of Syrian refugees 
in Turkey have been Sunni Arabs. 
Arab Alawites (not to be confused with 
Turkish Alevis) are mostly secular Muslims 
and, with a population of some 1.5 million, 
are the largest Arab minority inhabiting 
Turkey’s border region with Syria. They 
have largely supported the Assad regime 
and have sharply opposed Ankara’s recent 
policies toward Syria. They consider Tur-
key’s support for the Syrian opposition to 
be a sectarian choice aimed at empowering 
the Syrian Sunni majority. Indeed, tensions 
have been recorded between mainly Sunni 
refugees and Arab Alawite locals. For 
example, some Syrian refugees have been 
refused medical treatment by Alawite doc-
tors; others have boycotted local Alawite 
shopkeepers, while the latter have ques-
tioned Syrian clients about their sectarian 
identity before serving them. In September 
2012, as a response to growing tensions, the 
Turkish government adopted measures to 
avoid further sectarian escalation, such as 
transferring some Sunni refugees from 
Hatay to other provinces after clashes with 
locals, and calling for “more patience and 
hospitality for the brothers who will soon 
be going back to Syria”. 
The economic and social burden of the 
refugee presence has also led to mounting 
anti-refugee sentiments, as it is seen as the 
cause of higher unemployment and living 
costs for Turkish citizens, and of rising 
crime and prostitution. For instance, while 
the practice of polygamy is considered a 
crime by the Turkish Civil Code, Syrian 
refugee women have agreed to become 
second wives of Turkish citizens, or to get 
married early (under 18 years of age) as this 
seems preferable to refugee existence, espe-
cially in the south-eastern provinces of 
Mardin and Şanlıurfa. A non-governmental 
organization, the so-called Kilis Platform, 
has reported at least 4,000 cases of mar-
riage since 2012 in Kilis (a province of some 
125,000 people), with Syrian women or girls 
becoming second or third wives of Turkish 
men through religious marriage, which is 
not recognized under Turkish law. 
Since late 2012, growing anti-refugee 
sentiments have led to sporadic clashes 
between Turkish citizens and Syrian refu-
gees. Also, Turkish citizens have repeatedly 
protested against the presence of Syrian 
refugees, mainly but not exclusively in 
southern and south-eastern Turkey, where 
most of the refugees are concentrated. To 
date, tensions are still running high. 




In early 2012, the Turkish government – in 
cooperation with Turkish NGOs involved 
in humanitarian assistance within Syria – 
created a system known as “zero point 
delivery”. This method avoided infringing 
on Syria’s national sovereignty by deliver-
ing aid shipments to a border crossing, 
from where they were picked up by Syrian 
humanitarian workers (from local councils 
or NGOs) and taken to frontier camps with-
in Syria, especially Atmeh camp. This ap-
proach also sought to reduce the influx of 
refugees into Turkey, but had to be scaled 
back in November 2012, when the Syrian 
regime army bombed the area of Atmeh 
camp. This was due to radical groups assum-
ing control over border crossings, thus in-
creasing the risk of kidnapping for aid 
workers. 
At the same time Turkish public opinion 
has been increasingly wary of attacks ema-
nating from the border region. In February 
2012, a bomb killed 17 Turks at the Cilve-
gozu border crossing. In May 2012, two car 
bombs exploded in Reyhanli town center, 
only 5 km from the Cilvegozu border cross-
ing with Syria, leaving 46 dead and more 
than 100 injured. In June 2012, a Turkish 
fighter jet was shot down by the Syrian 
regime army over the Mediterranean, near 
the land border between the two countries. 
And in late September 2014, three Turks 
were injured when mortar shells landed 
in Suruç in the province of Şanlıurfa, as 
Islamic State (IS) fighters clashed with 
Kurdish forces on the other side of the 
border. 
In addition, Turkish civilians have been 
worried about the amount of freedom their 
government has granted to fighters who 
have used the camps for recruitment and 
recovery, and many others carrying weap-
ons outside the camps. Many think their 
government is also turning a blind eye to 
infiltration by fighters, and arms smug-
gling to the Syrian opposition. They fear 
that this could soon backfire, as Jihadist 
groups could turn against Ankara. 
International Burden Sharing 
So far, Turkey has managed the Syrian refu-
gee influx with considerable hospitality; 
but given the gravity, scale and duration 
of the humanitarian crisis in Syria, more 
international humanitarian support is 
needed. European countries in particular 
should offer to share the burden rather 
than hide behind Ankara’s earlier rejection 
of foreign support. The main challenges 
will be to better provide for refugees out-
side the camps, and to plan for the long-
term residence and integration of refugees. 
Cooperation between the EU, Turkey and 
the wider international community should 
address an array of issues. In particular, 
European countries should: 
 Pressure Turkey to open the door for in-
ternational humanitarian NGOs (INGOs) 
to work on its soil, allowing them to 
register more easily so that they can 
assume a more effective role in relief 
efforts. According to the UNHCR, ten 
INGOs have been registered in Turkey 
to date but only two have been allowed 
to operate in southern Turkey, while 
officials have turned a blind eye to un-
registered INGOs working there infor-
mally. 
 Share the burden of the refugee crisis 
by hosting more refugees themselves, 
as well as bearing some of the financial 
costs incurred by host states, especially 
Turkey. 
 Support the Turkish government in 
devising a long-term policy toward Syrian 
refugees. Along with other assistance, 
they should offer technical support to 
adapt Turkey’s legal framework accord-
ingly. They should also encourage An-
kara to devise policies aimed at reducing 
sectarian tensions in the southern region. 
 Improve coordination with Turkey (gov-
ernment and NGOs alike) and with UN 
bodies to ensure that cross-border aid 
is effective and serves civilians in Syria, 
rather than being captured by militant 
groups. 
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